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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NELLIE ALEXANDRA HANSEN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

;

vs.

i

Case No. 89-0249 CA

CARLISLE STUART FAUVER,

]i

Priority No. 14(b)

Defendant/Respondent.
BRIEF OF THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
ACTING AS AMICUS CURIAE
JURISDICTION; NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a District Court order in a domestic
relations case.

This Court has jurisdiction over this case

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1989), as
amended.
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
The Public Support of Children Act, in § 62A-11-3Q2, Utah
Code Annotated (Supp. 1988), sets forth the broad public policy
that "children shall be maintained form the resources of
responsible parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, at least in
part, the burden often borne by the general citizenry through
public assistance programs."

If parents fail to support their

children, the State of Utah, Department of Social Services (the
"Department") is often called upon to provide moneys for the
support of those children, at taxpayer expense.
Whenever a parent is legally relieved of his obligation to
support his child, this takes away the right of the Department to

seek to cause him to contribute toward the support of that child*
It causes the taxpayers to absorb a greater public assistance
expense than they might otherwise have to bear.

The Department

recognizes that there are occasions when circumstances justify
the extraordinary step of relieving a parent of his parental
rights and obligations.

The Department submits, however, that

this should take place only in exceptional circumstances and only
after legal requirements for the termination of parental rights
and obligations have been strictly complied with.
The Department believes that if the order of the District
Court were sustained on appeal, the door would open for parents
to enter into private agreements to terminate parental rights and
obligations , and to seek court approval thereof without making
the child a party or otherwise watching out for the interests of
the child.

Such agreements are inherently suspect, and something

as important as the termination of a parent's rights and
obligations should not be able to accomplished in that manner.
Such a result would not be in the best interests of the minor
children living in the State of Utah and it would be adverse to
the financial interests of the taxpayers as well.
For these reasons the Department is vitally interested in
this appeal and is submitting this brief on behalf of the
appellant.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

What is the legal effect of the stipulation and order

which purport to terminate the parental rights and obligations of
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the respondent (the "father") toward his daughter, the appellant
(the "child")?
2.

Does the child in this case have a cause of action

against her father for support, notwithstanding the stipulation
between her father and mother (to which she was not a party), and
the order approving it?
3.

Did the District Court have jurisdiction to terminate

the rights and duties of the father toward his child?
4.

Would it be consistent with the principles of equal

protection of the laws if parents of illegitimate children were
allowed to irrevocably terminate the obligations of the fathers
toward their children?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE
The following constitutional provisions are determinative in
this case:
Amendment XIVf Section 1, United States Constitution:
. . . [N]or shall any State . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Article I, Section 2, Constitution of Utah
All political power is inherent in the
people; and all free governments are founded
on their authority for their equal protection
and benefit. . . .
The following statutes are the determinative in this case:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-16(f) (1987):
Except as otherwise provided by law, the
[juvenile] court has exclusive original jurisdiction
in proceedings . . . to terminate the legal parentchild relationship, including termination of
residual parental rights and duties as defined. . • .
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of two cases which were consolidated below
(R. 164). The first case (No. 86-CV-354-U) was a petition for
determination of paternity filed in 1986 by Carlisle Stuart
Fauver against Patti Jill Hansen (the "mother"), who is the
mother of Nellie Alexandra Hansen, the appellant (R. 1). That
case resulted in a stipulation between Carlisle Stuart Fauver and
the mother, approved by order of the court, that Mr. Fauver was
the father of the child (R. 5, 8). The stipulation and order
purport to terminate the father's parental rights and duties
toward the child.

Copies of said stipulation and order are

included in the Appendix herein, as Exhibits "A" and "B,"
respectively.
In 1988, the mother filed a petition to modify that order,
seeking an order that the father be required to provide support
for the child (R. 11).
The second case was an independent action for support (No.
88-CV-270-U) filed in 1988 by the child, through her guardian ad
litem, against the father (R. 93).
Following consolidation of the cases the District Court held
a hearing and subsequently rendered a memorandum decision (R.
77), dated March 17, 1989, followed by a formal Order of
Dismissal (R. 80), dated April 10, 1989.

The order determined

that the child Nellie Hansen has no right to support from her
father Carlisle Stuart Fauver.

The memorandum decision and order

of dismissal are included in the Appendix herein as Exhibits "C"
and "D,M respectively.
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The child, by and through her guardian ad litemf filed this
appeal on April 27, 1989 (R. 84). This court subsequentlygranted an order authorizing the State Department of Social
Services to file a brief as amicus curiae.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Nellie Alexandra Hansen was born to Patti Jill Hansen and
Carlisle Stuart Fauver on July 9, 1986 (R. 5). On October 2,
1986, the father and mother filed a stipulation with the Seventh
(now Eighth) Judicial District Court in and for Uintah County,
State of Utah (R. 5). This stipulation was submitted with an
accompanying order approving the stipulation (R. 8). The court
approved the stipulation and signed the order on October 2, 1986,
the same day it was filed (R. 8). The child was not a party to
any of these proceedings.
The stipulation and order establish that Carlisle Stuart
Fauver is the father of the child.

They also purport to

terminate all of the father's parental rights and obligations,
including the obligation to support the child.
Tiie mother and the child (through a guardian ad litem)
subsequently filed various legal proceedings in an attempt to
obtain support from the father, on the grounds that the child was
in need of support from her father (R. 11, 93). The District
Court denied the requested relief on the basis that the
stipulation and order signed in 1986 terminated the father's
obligation to support the child, and that the child was bound
thereby (R. 80). This appeal followed.

-5-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The agreement between the mother and the fatherf and
the order approving it, purporting to terminate the father's
obligation to support his child, are void on the grounds that a
parent's duty to support his minor child cannot be alienated by
any action of the parents.

The Utah Supreme Court has held on

several occasions that a parent may not bargain away the
obligation of support.

The Court has further held that the right

to support is the child's right, and not the right of the
custodial parent.

Since the child was not a party to the

stipulation, she is not bound by it, and may pursue, through her
guardian ad litem, her own support claim.
The stipulation and the district court's order pursuant
thereto are also void because their effect was to terminate the
father's parental rights and duties with respect to the child.
Utah's statutes make it clear that jurisdiction to terminate
parental rights rests exclusively in the juvenile court, and that
correct procedure must be followed.

The district court lacked

jurisdiction over the matter of parental rights termination and
failed to follow the appropriate procedure.
Finally, for the court to give effect to the
stipulation and order would work a denial of the child's right to
Equal Protection under Amendment 14, Section 1 of the United
States Constitution and Article I, Sections 2 and 24 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah.

Utah law provides that an

illegitimate child has no less right to support than a child born
in a marriage.

Given that a child support order entered incident

to a divorce is always modifiable upon a showing of changed
circumstances, it would be harsh and inequitable to hold the
appellant child to the terms of an agreement to which she was not
a party, simply because she was born out of wedlock.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FATHER HAS AN OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT HIS DAUGHTER
AND SHE HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HIM FOR HER SUPPORT.
HIS AGREEMENT TO THE CONTRARY AND THE ORDER APPROVING
IT SHOULD BE DECLARED VOID AS AGAINST UTAH LAW
AND AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
The Utah Code expresses the duty of a parent to provide
for his offspring in unequivocal language:
support his child. . . ."

"Every man shall

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3 (1987).

Utah statutes contain other references to the parental support
duty as well.

The Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act

provides in § 78-45-4.2 that "Nothing contained herein shall act
to relieve the natural parent or adoptive parent of the primary
obligation of support. . . . " (emphasis added).

Another statute

sets forth the policy underlying the Public Support of Children
Act: "It is declared to be the public policy of this state that
this chapter be liberally construed and administered to the end
that children shall be maintained from the resources of
responsible parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, at least in
part, the burden often borne by the general citizenry through
welfare programs."
1988).

§ 62A-11-302, Utah Code Annotated (Supp.

Since the statutes are so explicit, the conclusion is

inescapable that the duty to support one's children is a
necessary concomitant of parenthood.
-7-

As the Utah Supreme Court has writtenf "the duty of
parents to support their children derives from natural law.

This

has been recognized from the earliest times as a proposition of
such incontestable correctness that it is neither subject to
doubt nor in need of explanatory justification; and this is
equally true of the corresponding right of a child to receive
support from his father."

State Div. of Family Services v.

Clark, 554 P.2d 1310, 1311 (1976)-

The Court in Clark

characterized the duty of support as "continuing and
inalienable."

Id.

The child support obligation persists even when the
parents have taken steps to eliminate it.

In Gulley v. Gulley,

570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977), the Court considered the case of a
divorced couple who had entered into a contract providing that
the father would be released from his financial obligations under
the divorce decree upon his payment of a lump sum.

The Court

held that while "[s]he and her husband were at liberty to bargain
with respect to his obligations to her," the father could not
contract out of his child support duty.

The Court echoed its

holding in Clark: "Every parent has the duty to support the
children he has brought into the world.

The duty is inalienable

and he cannot rid himself of it by purporting to transfer it to
someone else, by contract or otherwise."

Gulley, 570 P.2d at

128-9.
A similar holding was reached in Baqqs v. Anderson, 528
P.2d 141 (Utah 1974).

There, the Court noted that an agreement

by the parents removing the father's support duty had no effect
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on the rights of the child to support from his parents: "[A
father] cannot divest himself of that obligation, nor defeat the
child's right to support."

Icl. at 143.

In Hills v. Hills, 638

P.2d 516, 517 (1981), a later case also involving an attempt by
stipulation to renounce the father's duty of child support, the
Court wrote, "[tjhere is no merit to the contention that the
parents' stipulation effectively teirminated the father's parental
obligations.

The right to support from the parents belongs to

the minor children and is not subject to being bartered away,
extinguished, estopped, or in any way defeated by the agreement
or conduct of the parents" (citations omitted).

See also, Race

v. Race, 740 P.2d 253 (Utah 1987) (holding that a child's right
to support is his own), and Hansen v. Gossett, 590 P.2d 1258
(Utah 1979) (holding that the right to support is the right of
the children themselves).
It is manifest from the Court's holdings that a father
cannot relieve himself of his obligation of child support by
agreement with the child's mother.

In addition to the fact that

the duty is not subject to repudiation, it is elementary law that
an agreement between two parties cannot rescind a third party's
rights.

In Gulley, 570 P.2d at 129, the Court wrote that "the

minor children who are the beneficiaries of this duty were not
parties to the agreement and they could not be bound thereby."
(In its memorandum decision, at R. 78-79, the district
court expressed a concern that recognizing that children have an
independent right to support from their parents would mean that
guardians ad litem would have to be appointed for the children in
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every divorce and paternity case.

The Department respectfully

submits that even if such were the consequence, children do have
such an independent right in this State, as demonstrated herein,
and the district court failed to follow the law in making its
ruling.

But the Department further submits that the district

court's concerns on this point are unwarranted, because parents
in every divorce and paternity case do not try to terminate the
father's child support obligation, as happened in this case.

It

is relatively uncommon for parents to attempt such a thing.

Thus

it would be similarly uncommon that a guardian ad litem would
have to be appointed to represent the interests of the children
involved.)
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Gerhardt v. Estate of
Moore, 441 N.W.2d 734 (1989), found constitutional problems with
a state statute that permitted unmarried parents to relieve
themselves of their support obligations by contract.
III of Argument, infra.

See Point

But aside from constitutional concerns,

the court found a practical reason to refuse to give effect to
the parents' agreement.

As the court noted, "denying nonmarital

children the ability to obtain additional child support from
their fathers regardless of future circumstances could itself
result in an increased burden on the state welfare system."

Id.

at 739.
The Gerhardt court's reasoning is directly applicable
in this case.

It is unjust to shift the burden of providing

support for minor children to third parties, including the State.
Both the legislature and the courts have expressed intent that

-10-

the primary obligation of child support belongs to parents.

In

the instant case, the father is attempting to rely on an
agreement exactly of the sort held invalid on numerous occasions
by the Utah Supreme Court—an agreement to which the child was
not a party.
It should make no difference that the father and mother
submitted their stipulation to the court and obtained approval
thereof.

As is explained in Point II of the Argument, infra, the

district court lacked jurisdiction to terminate the father's
parental rights.

Even if the parties had been before the proper

court for such a purpose, they failed to follow the proper
procedures for terminating parental rights.

There is no legal

basis for the court to approve the type of settlement that
occurred in this case.

Section 78-45a-13, Utah Code Annotated

(1987), which deals with settlement agreements in paternity
cases, says that "An agreement of settlement with the alleged
father is binding only when approved by the court."

This section

is found in the very statute which provides for the establishment
of paternity and the establishment of the support obligations of
the father of an illegitimate child.

The Legislature surely

could not have intended that this section ever be used to justify
the entry of an order terminating the parental obligations of a
father who has just been (in the same order!) judicially
determined to be the father of a child born out of wedlock.
For the reasons given above, the stipulation and order
should be held void.

It was error for the lower court to hold

that child may not maintain her own cause of action. The
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district court erred in giving effect to the stipulation and
order.

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO
TERMINATE THE FATHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES.
As defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-2(21) (1987),
termination of parental rights "means the permanent elimination
of all parental rights and duties, including residual parental
rights and dutiesf by court order."

Residual rights and duties

are those remaining with the parent after legal custody "has
vested in another person or agency, including, but not limited
to, the responsibility for support, the right to consent to
adoption, the right to determine the child's religious
affiliation, and the right to reasonable visitation unless
restricted by the court

" Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-2(18),

emphasis added.
It is clear that the 1986 court order in this case was
intended to terminate the parental rights and obligations of the
father.

For example, the order includes the following provision

in paragraph 8:

"Petitioner hereby forever waives and disclaims

any right accruing under the parent-child relationship between
him and [his] minor child."

(R. 9). The order further provides

that the father "shall not be held legally or financially
responsible for the minor child, and respondent [Patti Jill
Hansen] waives all future child support payments or any other
form of support from petitioner."

Ld. at paragraph 6.

In

addition, the father specifically waived all future claims to
-12-

custody and visitation, and agreed that any petition for the
adoption of the child could be granted without his participation,
and without any notice to him.

Id. at paragraphs 2, 4, and 9.

Finally, the first paragraph of the order also indicates that the
father had signed in open court a "Consent to Termination of
Parental Rights."

(R. 9)

That Consent is found on page 3 of the

record.
Utah law provides that the Utah Juvenile Court "has
exclusive, original jurisdiction in proceedings: . . . (f) to
terminate the legal parent-child relationship, including
termination of residual parental rights and duties as defined."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-16 (1987).

At § 78-3a-48 (2), the statute

specifies that "[a] termination of parental rights may be ordered
only after a hearing is held specifically on the question of
terminating the rights of the parent or parents."

Even in a case

where a parent voluntarily requests termination, the juvenile
court must still make a finding that termination is in the best
interests of both the parent and the child.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-3a-48(5)
In J.CO. v, Anderson, 734 P.2d 458 (1987), a Utah
district court had acquired jurisdiction in an adoption
proceeding filed by the foster parents of two minor children.
While that adoption proceeding was pending, the State filed a
separate proceeding in juvenile court to terminate the parental
rights of the natural parents, who had abandoned the children.
The juvenile court terminated the natural parents' parental
rights, and they then appealed, claiming the juvenile court
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lacked jurisdiction to do so.

The Utah Supreme Court held that

although the district court had jurisdiction over the adoption
petition, only the juvenile court had jurisdiction in the matter
of termination of the natural parents' rights.
The case of Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516 (Utah 1981),
is directly applicable to the instant proceeding.

Hills involved

a divorced mother and father who executed in district court prior
to their divorce a stipulation according to which the father
relinquished all rights to the parties' children.
was made for child support.

No provision

The Utah Supreme Court held that the

children's right to support could not be defeated by the conduct
of the parents, and that the stipulation had no effect.

The

Court further held that "[i]f parental rights and obligations are
to be terminated, this must be done by court decree in the manner
prescribed by law."

After noting the Utah Code's requirement

that specific procedures must be followed, the Court wrote that
"the drastic remedy of termination of parental duties cannot be
validly decreed—with or without stipulation—without a hearing
devoted to this question and including the submission of evidence
and careful judicial consideration of all of the interests
involved, including the child's."

Ld. at 517, emphasis in

original•
These authorities show that the district court exceeded
its authority by entering the order, the effect of which was to
terminate the father's rights and duties.

Since the district

court lacked jurisdiction and failed to follow correct procedure
in any event, the stipulation and order are void.

-14-

POINT III
UPHOLDING THE ORDER AND STIPULATION WOULD DISCRIMINATE
AGAINST THE CHILD ON THE BASIS OF HER ILLEGITIMACY
AND DENY HER THE RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION.
If the Plaintiff had been born to married parents who
later divorcedf there is no doubt that any child support order
contained in her parents' divorce decree could be modified as
reasonable and necessary under the parties' circumstances.

Under

Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5, the court granting the divorce retains
continuing jurisdiction over matters of child support.

In

Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 1303f 1305 (1980), the Court noted
that "[u]nder Utah law, a divorce court sits as a court in equity
so far as child custody, support payments, and the like are
concerned.

It likewise retains continuing jurisdiction over the

parties, and power to make equitable redistribution or other
modification of the original decree as equity might dictate."
The court's power to modify child support obligations
persists even when no child support is awarded in the original
decree.

In Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (1985), the Utah

Supreme Court maintained that "[t]he fact that one parent is not
currently required to pay support to the other neither terminates
the child's right nor obviates the parent's responsibility for
such support as may be determined at some future time."

Ijd. at

394, citations omitted.
In light of the protection that children born in
wedlock enjoy with regard to the assurance of parental support,
it seems unjustly discriminatory to foreclose the appellant
child's right to support because of her parents' earlier
-15-

agreement.

By upholding the agreement, the district court

withheld from her a source of support to which she would have
been entitled if she had been born in a marriage—in effect,
punishing the child for the fact that her parents were not
married.
It is noteworthy that Utah's statutes make it clear
that the child support obligation is not diminished by the fact
that a child was born out of wedlock.

Section 78-45a-l states

that M[t]he father of a child which is or may be born out of
wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father of a child
born in wedlock . . . for the education, necessary support and
funeral expenses of the child. . . . " (emphasis added)

The

District Court's action was contrary to notions of equal
protection as codified in the pertinent Utah statutes.
The District Court's action is also contrary to Article
I, § 2 of the Utah State Constitution and Amendment 14, § 1 of
the United States Constitution.

The Utah provision states: "All

political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit . . . ."

By the terms of the Federal

Constitution, "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a case remanded from
the U.S. Supreme Court for further consideration in light of
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. — , 108 S. Ct. 1910, 100 L. Ed. 2d 465
(1988), recently addressed the equal protection issues raised by
the practice of upholding agreements in which an unmarried father
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attempts to divest himself of his child support obligations by
agreement with the mother.
N.W.2d 734 (1989)-

Gerhardt v. Estate of Moore, 441

While that court dealt with (and ultimately

invalidated) a statutory scheme that allowed such agreements, the
court's reasoning was applicable to the instant case.

The

Wisconsin court held that it is unfair, as well as
unconstitutional, for nonmarital (but not marital) children to be
barred from seeking increases in support amounts, regardless of
their need:

"Upholding this inability to seek additional support

from their fathers would deprive [plaintiff] and certain other
nonmarital children of something which marital children have
always had, . . . namely the right to seek support from both
their parents during the whole of their minority."

Ld. at 738.

In the case at hand, it was inconsistent with the
principles of equal protection for the district court to have
upheld the agreement between the child's mother and father.

The

lower court erred in maintaining that the child may not obtain
support from her father, even if it means modifying the 1986
order which absolved him of any child support obligations.

To

hold otherwise would be tantamount to an acceptance of the
proposition that children born to unwed parents are not entitled
to the same economic protections marital children enjoy—a
proposition clearly contrary to existing law and the principles
of equal protection.
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CONCLUSION
The Department respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the order of the district courtf hold that the
stipulation and order terminating the father's support obligation
are void as a matter of law, hold that the child has an
independent cause of action for support from her father, and
remand the matter to the district court for a determination of an
appropriate support obligation for the father towards the
appellant child.
DATED this

31

day of August, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

BLAINE R. FERGUSON U
Assistant Attorney General
C E R T I F I C A T E
I certify that on this

OF

OI

S E R V I C E

day of August, 1989, I mailed

four copies of this Brief to each of the following persons at the
following addresses, postage prepaid:
Brian M. Barnard
Utah Legal Clinic
Attorney for Appellant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3204
Harry H. Souvall
McRae & DeLand
Attorneys for Respondent
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078

BLAINE R. FERGUSON (J
Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CARLISLE STUART FAUVER,
Petitioner,

STIPULATION

vs.

Civil No.^£(/3>^V~6C

PATTI JILL HANSEN,
Respondent.

Carlisle

Stuart Fauver, the

petitioner,

and

Patti

Jill Hansen, the respondent, having duly considered what is in
the best interests of Nellie Alexandra Hansen, the minor child
of the parties, and desiring to create a healthy environment
in which the minor child can grow, hereby stipulate and agree
as follows:
1.
the

natural

Carlisle Stuart Fauver and Patti Jill Hansen are
parents

of

the minor

child,

Nellie

Alexandra

Hansen (hereafter referred to as "Alex", born July 9, 1986).
2.
to

the

Permanent custody of the child shall be granted

respondent.

Petitioner

agrees

custody by him or anyone claiming
waived.

EXHIBIT A

that

any

claims to

through him are forever

3.

The petitioner forfeits all legal rights to the

child, and makes no claias as parent for any purpose included
but not limited to an income tax deduction.
4*

The petitioner agrees to make no demands to spend

time with the child*

The parties agree this does not forbid

interaction

father

between

and

daughter,

but

any

such

interaction requires complete approval from the mother.
5.

In the event of the death of respondent, custody

of the child shall be transferred to the party designated by
respondent, or to the maternal grandparents if no designation
has been made.

Petitioner waives any right to challenge said

transfer of custody.
6«

The

petitioner

shall

not

be

held

legally

or

financially responsible for the minor child and the respondent
agrees to waive all future child support payments or any other
form of support from petitioner.
7.

The petitioner agrees that contemporeanously with

this Stipulation, he will execute in open Court a consent to
adoption

and

waiver

of parental rights.

Said consent will

provide that petitioner will not object to the adoption of
said minor child and that the respondent has no obligation to
inform petitioner of said adoption.
8o

At

his discretion, petitioner

may

establish a

financial arrangement he feels is appropriate to insure some
measure of future financial security for the minor child.
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9.

Any and all obligations between petitioner and

respondent that may have arisen as a result of the birth of
the minor child that have not been resolved by this agreement
shall be terminated.
DATED this

jQ

day of September, 1986.

CARLISLE STUART FAUVER'

PATTI JILL HANSEN

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

SSt

SUBSCRIBED TO AND SWORN before me this

/?

day of

September, 1986.

^/t^/A(/f!i4<</iU
NOTARY PUBLIC

My commission expires:

Residing

. i .

,

at:^c£'Jftuffcs-uy

L. A. DBVBR. #0875
McRAE & DeLAND
Attorneys for petitioner
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Dtah 84078
Telephonet 789-1666

OCT 2 1985
Outiutnr

LUUK

CLERK

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CARLISLE STUART FAUVER,

:

Petitioner,

:

vs.

:

PATTI JILL HANSEN,

:

Defendant.

The

above

O R D E R

Civil No.

:

entitled

action

came

on

regularly

for

hearing this 2d day of October, 1986f before the Honorable
Richard C. Davidson.

Petitioner appeared in person and was

represented by counsel, L. A* Dever.
in person

or

through counsel*

Defendant did not appear

A Stipulation

entered

between the parties was presented to the Court.

into

The Court

having approved said stipulation and having heard testimony of
petitioner,

and

petitioner

having

signed

in open Court a

Consent to Termination of Parental Rights, and being fully
advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.
the

natural

Carlisle Stuart Fauver and Patti Jill Hansen are
parents of the minor

child,

Hansen, born July 9, 1986.

EXHIBIT B

Nellie

Alexandra

2.
awarded

to

Permanent custody of said minor child is hereby
Patti

Jill

Hansen.

Any

claims

to

custody

by

petitioner or anyone claiming through him are forever waived.
3.

Petitioner

forfeits

all

legal

rights

to

the

child, and makes no claim as parent for any purpose including,
but not limited to, an income tax deduction.
4.
time

with

Petitioner is ordered to make no demands to spend
the

child.

Any

interaction

between

father

and

daughter must be upon the complete approval of defendant.
5.
of

the

In the event of the death of respondent, custody

child

is ordered

to be

transferred

to

the party

designated by respondent or to the maternal grandparents if
no designation has been made.

Petitioner waives any right to

challenge said transfer of custody.
6.

Petitioner

shall

not

be

held

legally

or

financially responsible for the minor child and the respondent
waives all future child support payments or any other form of
support from petitioner,
7.

Petitioner may, at his discretion, establish a

financial arrangement he feels is appropriate to insure some
measure of future financial security for the minor child.
8.

Petitioner

hereby forever waives and disclaims

any right accuring under the parent-child relationship between
him and said minor child.
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9.
upon

him

Petitioner hereby waives any notice or service
of

any

petition

for

adoption

involving

Nellie

Alexandra Hansen and said adoption may be granted without his
participation.
10.

Any and all obligations between petitioner and

respondent that may have arisen as a result of the birth of
the

minor

child

that

have

not

been

resolved

are

terminated.
DATED this fl?^ day of October, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

RICHARD C. DAVIDSON
District Court Judge
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hereby

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CARLISLE STUART FAUVERf
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
PATTI JILL HANSEN,
Defendant*

Civil No. 86-CV-354U

This matter is before the court for consideration of the
claim of Nellie Alexandra Hansen (herein "the child") for support
against her father, Carlisle Stuart Fauver (herein "Fauver").

In

1986, Fauver filed a paternity action to determine his rights and
responsibilities regarding the child and her mother, Patti Jill
Hansen (herein "Hansen")•

In that action, Fauver and Hansen

entered into a stipulation in which Fauver gave up any rights
regarding the child, and Hansen "waived all future child support
payments or any other form of support from petitioner" (Fauver).
Stipulation, page 2, paragraph 6.

A court order was entered in

accordance with the terms of the stipulation.
On November 21, 1988, the child through her guardian ad
litem, filed an independent action for support, claiming that
she was not bound by the terms of the stipulation and order
because she was not a party to the previous action.

On

December 5, 1988, Hansen filed a petition to modify the order

EXHIBIT C

originally entered, claiming a substantial change of circumstances.

The two actions were then consolidated for determination

of the issues.
Prior to consolidation, the child filed a Motion for Temporar
Support, and after consolidation, filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Fauver responded with a Motion to Dismiss for falure

to state a cause of action.

Oral arguments on the pending motions

were heard on March 7, 1989.
Hansen and the child ask the court to declare that the
stipulation is void as against public policy, and/or that the
child may maintain the independent cause of action.

Fauver

alleges that the stipulation and order are binding upon Hansen
and the child, and that there has been no change of circumstance to warrant any amendment to the order.
Having carefully considered the pleadings, memoranda and.
oral arguments, the court rules as follows:
(1)

The stipulation and the order based thereon

entered into between Fauver and Hansen are not void as against
public policy.

If the agreement and order provided, or the

subsequent facts indicated that the child was left without any
support, the agreement could perhaps be voided.

However, the

agreement provides that Hansen will have exclusive custody of
the child.

Thus, Hansen assumed the responsibility for the

care as well as the custody of the child.
(2)

The child may not maintain a separate cause of

action for support.

To allow such actions after one of the

natural parents had entered into an agreement for, or had been
awarded an order of support for the benefit of the child, has
the potential of creating chaos in the area of domestic relations
law.

At the very least, each paternity action, or divorce action

involving children would require the appointment of the parent
or another as guardian ad litem to insure that such actions
would not arise years after all other litigation was completed.
For this reason, the court rules as stated above.
(3)

If Hansen is to have any cause of action for

child support, she must at least, show a significant change of
circumstances.

However, the court is not convinced that the

order herein based upon this particular stipulation is subject
to modification.
that point.

Counsel is invited to submit memoranda on

If the court finds it is subject to modification,

an evidentiary hearing will be held on that point.
(4)

Based on the foregoing rulings, the motion for

summary judgment is denied, the motion for temporary support is
denied, and the motion for dismissal is denied without
prejudice.
DATED this

day of March, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

<Q
cc:

Harry H. Souvall
Ron Nehring
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
STATE OF UTAH

CARLISLE STUART FAUVER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

UINTAH COUNTY

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

PATTI JILL HANSEN,
Defendant,
Civil No. 86-CV-354 U
NELLIE ALEXANDRA HANSEN, by
and through her Guardian Ad
Litem, Nancy Olsen, Maternal
Aunt,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Civil No. 88-CV-270-U
CARLISLE STUART FAUVER,
Defendant.

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court
on March 7, 1989 for oral arguments and hearing on the
motion of Carlisle Stuart Fauver to dismiss the complaint of
Nellie Alexandra Hansen for failure to state a cause of
action, the Hon. Dennis Draney, Judge presiding, Carlisle
Stuart Fauver being represented by his counsel, Harry H.
Souvall and the minor child Nellie Alexandra Hansen by and
through her guardian ad litem being represented by Ron
Neerings, the Court having reviewed the file and the
pleadings therein, having heard the arguments and
representations of respective counsel, the Court having
EXlfrBIT D

taken the matter under advisement and having issued a
memorandum decision, based thereon and for good cause
appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
complaint of the minor child, Nellie Alexandra Hansen, as
against Carlisle Stuart Fauver should be and hereby is
dismissed as no cause of action, the Court finding and
determining that the child may not maintain a separate cause
of action for support from her natural father when there has
previously been a resolution of the child support obligation
between the parents; further,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that as to the minor child Nellie
Alexandra Hansen the stipulation and agreement by which
Patti Jill Hansen gave up any claim of child support against
Carlisle Stuart Fauver is not void as against public policy;
further,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this
order of dismissal shall constitute a final judgment as it
resolves all pending issues between Nellie Alexandra Hansen,

her guardian ad litem and Carlisle Stuart Fauver, and this
Court finds and determines that this order of is an
appealable order.

DATED this

|D

-Hf\
day oflj£r6h, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

mkPl.

DEMS'/L. DRAMET"
JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL to:
HARRY H. SOUVALL
McRAE & DELAND
Attorneys for Fauver
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
on the J£9th day of March, 1989,, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.

JRIAN W. BARMRD

Attorney for Minor Chirld

